lt general jonathon riley, military doctrine

Military Doctrine Articles & Publications

By Lt-Gen Jonathon Riley CB DSO PhD MA


The Goražde Mission 1995

A British Battalion Commander's perspective on what happened in Goražde in the spring of 1995. An interview by Anders Fjellestad

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COMBAT LOGISTICS 2015

© 2016

Teaching Practical Strategy:
The Contemporary War and Warfare Course at King’s College London

Contemporary War and Warfare is a postgraduate (Masters’) level course forming part of several Master’s degrees taught in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London...

Lieutenant General Jonathon Riley, who won the Distinguished Service Order for defending the Muslim enclave in Gorazde in 1995 before rising to become General Officer Commanding British Forces in Iraq and Deputy Commander of ISAF in Afghanistan, presents on the role of senior military commanders in war and the major issues arising from dealing with allies;

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the battle within

© 2016

The Battle Within: A Soldiers Story by Neil Spencer
Forward by Lt General Jonathon Riley

THE BATTLE WITHIN, a soldiers story. Foreword written by Lt General Jonathan Riley CB DSO. From his early days raised into a working class family, suffering from years of school bullying leaving him with low self-esteem and confidence issues to the day he joined the British Army and the challenging events that followed. Newly recruited into 1RWF and quickly adopted by the morter platoon. Life couldn't be better. Within just 12 months he took part in many training exercises in both the UK and aboard. From parachute training, covering the national firestrikes to training as a patrol medic. Plus more. Neil was even planning an attempt on the extremely tough SAS selection course.

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COMBAT LOGISTICS 2015

© 2015

Can Limited Intervention Work?
Lessons from Britain's Success Story in Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT Following frustrating campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western interventions are becoming more limited, with troops being deployed for short bursts and residual peace-building tasks being left to others. Although this approach limits exposure for the intervening government, it struggles to achieve meaningful political change. Examining the comparatively successful British intervention in Sierra Leone (2000 – 02), this article identifies the conditions for effectiveness in these campaigns. It challenges the historiography of the case by framing armed confrontations and raids as enablers of politics rather than ends in themselves; indeed, in both the conduct and study of intervention, politics must reign supreme

Contributor - Lieutenant-General Jonathon Riley

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COMBAT LOGISTICS 2015

© 2015

Chairman’s Opening Remarks for COMBAT LOGISTICS 2015
Conference run by The Development Network UK. Chaired by Lieutenant-General Riley
April 2015

By Lieutenant-General Jonathon Riley

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information operations

© 2015

Military & Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-14: an incoherent approach
Briefing - Barbara J Stapleton & Michael Keating
Asia Programme | July 2015 | Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisit Series No. 10
Chatham House

With References by General Jonathon Riley, former deputy commander of ISAF, October 2007-January 2009 on his direct experience of the military command structure .

Interviews: Oxford 4 March 2015


The Use of Force, Its Authorisation and Consequences

© 2006

ROE: The Use of Force, Its Authorisation and Consequences
Operational Experience from Bosnia to Iraq

I have been asked to give a few examples of ROE from my own experience, with some indication of how these played out. I will do that, and then give a few conclusions on how ROE affect a field commander,


Lt-Gen

© 2014

Command and Control of the Modern Battlefield
Article by Lt-Gen Riley

The Nature of Modern Battle

A Lieutenant Colonel as long ago as 1995 in Gorazde, I found myself not only commanding the Task Force - with my immediate superior being a Lieutenant General - but also heavily engaged in brokering inter-factional meetings to resolve disputes, UN civil affairs, humanitarian aid; and then switching to commanding combat operations with close air support...


Service of a Soldier

© 2007

Technology in the Service of a Soldier

Technology Versus The Human Condition

And so to the first contention. We have heard in this conference how technology has advanced rapidly over the last 10 years, and continues to do so. However against this background of rapid change there is one thing that has not changed: the human condition. Evolution works far more slowly, first through mutations, or accidents in reproduction, and then through natural selection.


Service of a Soldier

© 2007

Counterinsurgency & War Studies

As a visiting professor in War Studies at King's College London, Lieutenant-General Jonathon Riley, together with Professor Theo Farrell, discuss the rise and fall of Counterinsurgency and the Afghanistan War, as part of the seminar series at the Department of War Studies.


strat-comms

© 2005

Thoughts on Strategic Communications in Complex Emergencies

Information is power, and how one party in any conflict uses that power determines how effective its efforts will be. Information is a force-multiplier, a decision tool, a central part of a campaign: in other words, it is firepower and like many sorts of firepower, it can result in blue on blue if it is not targeted correctly. It can also be a weapon of mass effect.

It is targeted at very different audiences, who may interpret the same message, or various actions, in different ways, and often we are far from clear about the nature of those audiences and their likely reactions, with the subtlety required and with the explicit linkage between messages and actions....


Decisive Battles

© 2011

Decisive Battles

In his 1973 book, War and Politics, Bernard Brodie characterised the Tet Offensive in Vietnam as the decisive engagement of that war – not because the Americans had won all the tactical battles, including Hue, but because the campaign persuaded the political leadership and the military command ultimately that they could not win the war. By implication, therefore, it is not battles that win wars, but campaigns. This has I believe been a trend since the industrial revolution reached its peak: once a society was organized for mass production...


Disengagement of Forcesr

©

Supervising the Disengagement of Forces During Peace Support Operations

The subject of Peace Support Operations is a wide one and is currently attracting much attention. What is already clear is that in situations of conflict but short of war - where conflict may be intra¬state but war is always inter-state (1) - there exists a growing variety of operations which require the deployment of military forces, probably multinational, in support of UN Resolutions. These operations will be covered by both...