attributed to Maj. Gen. H T Siborne! I have been assured by the publishers that this most unfortunate error will be corrected when the book is reprinted...

If you are interested in the historiography of Waterloo and do not already possess a copy, you should definitely add this book to your library; if you simply want a one volume account of the campaign, complete with maps, that does not go into such exhaustive detail, you will probably prefer one of the many modern books on the subject.

Arthur Harman

BRITISH SUBMARINE VS ITALIAN TORPEDO BOAT, MEDITERRANEAN 1940-43
By David Greenstreet, Osprey Duel Series 74, £12.99, (eBook £10.99)

This book is an in-depth account and analysis of the underwater fight for the Italian sea lanes to North Africa as part of the Mediterranean naval war between 1940 and the surrender of Italy in 1943. For a time, only submarines operating out of Malta were in a position to interdict the Italian supply lines, as surface ships were driven from the area by the Luftwaffe. Overall, 25% of Italian merchant ship losses were attributed to submarines, although there were a further 22% of losses for which causes were unknown. This makes the battle between the submarines and escorts of particular interest.

This book describes the development and design of the British submarine classes which operated in the Mediterranean, explaining the purpose behind the design, the named boats in the class, speed and equipment. It does likewise for the Italian torpedo boats. The book goes on to describe the various technical specifications of the submarines and torpedo boats in more detail, specifically, the equipment used for detecting submarines and surface ships, together with the boats' and ships' engines and mobility and their armament. This is continued with a review of the personnel and training and command and control arrangements. There is a short section on tactics and a longer section on the course of the campaign in terms of the strategic situation and the British and Italian perspectives, followed by a description of selected combats in six month chunks. The book rounds off with a section on statistics and analysis.

Quite properly, it does not attempt to determine who won the fight between the submarines and the escorts. The reader can make his own assessment, but casualties were high on both sides. That said, the torpedo boats were not the prey of submarines, but were the guardians they had to get past to get at their targets: the merchant ships. What is clear is that the escorts were more effective when accompanied by aircraft. That was also the British experience in the North Atlantic against the German U-Boats.

The book is supported throughout by some excellent photographs, artwork and top and side art of submarines and torpedo boats. There are some examples of submarine attacks against convoys which could be used as the basis for a tabletop game, but generally, this is not a book for wargaming except in the most strategic or background sense. For all that, it is a detailed and fascinating account of one aspect of the Mediterranean maritime war up to 1943.

Overall, this is a great book, well researched and written and is clearly a labour of love from an author with a great interest in the subject. It is thoroughly recommended for both those with a general interest and the expert alike.

Martin Pike

OFT IN DANGER, THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF GENERAL SIR ANTHONY FARRAR-HOCKLEY

Back in 1956, I received a book token for a Christmas present and used it to buy Great Escape Stories. This consisted almost wholly of World War II stories. The only exception was the story of Captain Farrar-Hockley, who was captured by the Chinese at the Injin River and who escaped and was recaptured five times during his captivity from April 1951 until his release in August 1953. Rather later, I knew of him as one of the Army's most senior and experienced commanders, one around whom you walked with circumspection. Even so, I had little real idea of the depth and breadth of his service. The public at large knew a lot less, so it is appropriate and high time that the career of this most professional soldier is retold.

His operational service was remarkable, especially by modern standards. He fought, in order, the Germans, the Greek Communists, the Jewish Irgun, the Chinese in Korea, the Egyptians at Suez, the Arabs in Aden and the Indonesians in Borneo, before ending up in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. Fighting the Germans and the Chinese left him convinced of the absolute necessity for hard training and positive leadership. Any group he commanded had to be able to overmatch any opponent, and his concern for his soldiers greatly outweighed any thought of trimming his sails for any political, extraneous reason.

During his service as a commander the British Army poured its resources into the British Army of the Rhine and the European Commitment, but then demanded that the far less well-resourced parts, including the Parachute Regiment, sort out the end of Empire commitments with outdated equipment and baffling directives. It is no surprise, therefore, that the first units in Northern Ireland attempted to deal with insurrection in the same way that they had dealt with riots in Egypt, Aden or Cyprus. After his stellar performance in the Radfan, TFH
became the poster boy of the unresourced half of the Army. But in the words of the author, at the conclusion of TFL’s time in Northern Ireland in 1970, “He gave clear military advice to his political master and expected in return that be a consistency of approach, a statement of strategic objectives and then a reasonably hands-off policy to allow the military the freedom of action to proceed.”

But this was not how he was viewed within the military establishment. Field Marshal Carver’s view was: “In a campaign so close to home and at such an early stage, his advice was often too blunt and his reaction to fudging the issues caused more than a little irritation by those whose responsibility was to confront issues and take decisions, but who seemed incapable of doing so.”

He was an uncomfortable presence, an outsider to the system and not properly house-trained, a man of the frontier, rather than of the drawing room.

He was eventually allowed a stint in Germany, but as an outsider he was unable to reform the entrenched mindset that he found there. He was not allowed onto the Army Board (at a time when the Army Board was noted for selecting clubbable chaps in its own image), despite the fact that his record of service qualified him to speak truth to power in a way that others, some of whom had never heard a shot fired in anger, could not. This is somewhat reminiscent of the position of Kitchener in 1914. The difference was, of course, that there was no national crisis that demanded his presence.

Instead, he was sent to a senior NATO appointment in Norway, where he was forced to watch events unfolding at home that he would have been well able to assist with. But by now, his reputation was that of a thundering Old Testament Prophet who brooked no compromise. That said, he must have taken comfort from the successes of the Paras in the Falklands, which could be seen as full vindication of his legacy. Moreover, the fact that a Parachute Regiment Officer, Rupert Smith, was selected to lead the UK’s Armoured Division in the First Gulf War, was testimony to the fact that the ‘Heavy Metal’ side of the Army was still not able to grow its own talent in-house.

This is a very good portrait of an exceptional British soldier. He experienced more than any of his contemporaries, and while he was no innovator, his vast repertoire of experience, all registered mentally, gave him a comprehensive ‘play list’ that he was able to draw on.

Jonathon Riley has given us a comprehensive portrait of TFL. Indeed, there is almost too much detail in some areas, which can detract from the thread of the story, and yet it is a bit thin in others. The man who springs from the page was indeed a warrior whose formative years were spent in areas too dangerous for the media, before the hierarchy fully developed its ‘long screwdriver’, and before the public forgot that armies must be prepared to take losses in order to keep the nation safe. It can confidently be said that TFL was someone who gave the full measure of devotion to his country and his soldiers and who never flinched from his duty. We are indebted to Jonathon Riley for reminding us of what it was like to soldier in the middle of the last century, before aversion to risk and lack of funding emasculated the British Armed Forces.

John Drewienkiewicz

THE TANK COMMANDER: POCKET MANUAL 1939-1945

This is a superb 160-page hardback collection of various articles and reports on tank warfare in WWII, drawing on British, US, Russian and German tactical appraisals and training notes. There are five sections - crew training, tactics, ‘in theatre’, knowing the enemy, and ‘in the turret’ (the last three sections being broadly similar in describing actual tactical situations).

The remit is very varied, ranging from instructions on tank gurneys, maintenance, camouflage, driving, ammunition conservation and so on, to action reports from the Russian, European and Far Eastern theatres of war. The author has drawn from a good range of sources, all of which are listed, enabling you to delve further (in the case of websites or National Archives) should you so wish.

This is probably a ‘must’ for the serious armoured warfare enthusiast, especially for those with a taste for skirmish warfare. One thing that really strikes you from the tactical reports is the ease with which even experienced crews could ditch/crash the vehicle – and it wasn’t a deliberate attempt to avoid action! I suspect that our rules seriously underestimate the impact of this.

Chris Jarvis

VIII CORPS: THE SOMME 1916
Published by Vexillia Ltd, PDF/Print on Demand £14.50

Multi-Play

VIII Corps: The Somme 1916 is a card game, the first in a series of games written by Neil Reid, and is currently available in PDF ‘print and play’ format, and is designed to give the players some appreciation of the difficulties faced by VIII Corps on the first day of the Battle of the Somme as the British 4th, 29th and 31st Divisions attacked the villages of Beaumont Hamel, Serre and the Heidenkopf Redoubt.

The game consists of 77 cards, which are divided into nine Terrain cards, 39 British and 29 German cards.

Each terrain card details a certain area of the battlefield. At the start of the game, the terrain cards are set out in 3 x 3 grid. The objective of the game is for the British player to attack and capture two of the German Support Line terrain cards, which obviously means that they have to advance through the Front and Second line defences first.

Each player has a hand of cards, and these are divided into a mix of Strategic and Tactical cards. Strategic Cards include different types of artillery barrage (or cards that negate them), the ability to draw more cards into your hand or to look at some of your opponent’s cards. Tactical Cards provide ‘Assault Points’ which are used to launch infantry attacks.

The game lasts a number of turns, which are divided into Strategic and Tactical phases. Only Strategic Cards can be played during the Strategic phase, and only Tactical cards can be played during the Tactical phase.

During the first four turns of the game, only the Strategic Phase is played, which represents the pre-battle artillery bombardment. The idea is for the British player to attempt to cause as much